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Asset Restructuring and the Cost of Capital

Abstract
We empirically examine whether the elimination of negative synergies, the reduction of internal
capital market inefficiencies, and the mitigation of information problems following spinoffs
lower cost of equity. The results indicate that there is no decrease in the cost of equity in the full
sample, which suggests that the gains around spinoffs are primarily a consequence of
improvements in cash flow and operating performance rather than a decline in systematic risk or
the cost of equity. However, we find a positive relation between the spinoff gains and a decrease
in the cost of equity for the subsample of firms with high information asymmetry, and for the
subsample of non-focus-increasing spinoffs shown in prior studies to have no improvements in
future cash flow or operating performance. For firms with high information asymmetry, the
relation between the spinoff gains and the decline in cost of equity is attributable to a decline in
the cost of equity of the post-spinoff parent entity. The results indicate that spinoffs facilitate a
decrease in adverse selection costs, and this is especially value enhancing for the parent firms,
which are higher growth and more reliant on external capital.

1.

Introduction
The recent decade has seen a resurgence in corporate refocusing initiatives by firms

through divestitures.

Extant literature documents that most of these divestitures are value

enhancing for the shareholders of these firms.1 Several arguments have been proposed for the
observed gains around divestitures, foremost among them being the improvement in focus and
the elimination of the inefficiencies of internal capital markets, mitigation of information
asymmetry regarding the different divisions of multi-division firms, and improved alignment of
managerial incentives with shareholder incentives.2
Most of the prior studies imply that the gains around divestitures are achieved primarily
through an improvement in the future cash flows due to the elimination of the existing
inefficiencies. However, given that a firm’s equity value is the present value of future cash flows
to equity discounted at the cost of equity, any increase in the share price may be explained either
by an expected improvement in future cash flows, or an anticipated decline in the cost of equity,
or both. While several theoretical studies provide implications for why the reallocation of assets
and the elimination of inefficiencies through divestitures could affect the cost of equity, none of
the prior empirical studies examine the link between the divestiture gains and changes in the cost
of equity. In this paper, we focus on a specific type of divestiture, corporate spinoffs, and
analyze changes in the systematic risk around spinoffs to study whether the gains can be
explained by a decrease in the cost of equity.

1 See for example, Hite and Owers (1983), Schipper and Smith (1983 and 1986), Comment and Jarrell (1995), John

and Ofek (1995), Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) Allen and McConnell (1998), and Berger and Ofek (1999).
2 Evidence of divestiture gains from improvement in focus and the elimination of internal capital market
inefficiencies is in Comment and Jarrell (1995), Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997), Desai and Jain (1999),
Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (2002), Ahn and Denis (2002), and Burch and Nanda (2002), theory and evidence
of gains from the mitigation of information asymmetry are in Habib, Johnson, and Naik (1997), Krishnaswami and
Subramaniam (1999), Nanda and Narayanan (1999), and Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu (2001), and arguments
relating the gains to improved alignment of managerial incentives is in Aron (1991).
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Firms typically divest assets through asset sales, equity carve-outs, or spinoffs. While the
impact of divestitures on systematic risk and cost of equity capital may be important in all three
modes of divestitures, there are specific advantages to focusing on corporate spinoffs. Spinoffs
provide a cleaner vehicle to study risk changes because, unlike equity carve-outs, a spinoff
separates the divisions of a multi-division firm completely so that there can no longer be any
internal transfers between the divisions, and each division trades as a stand-alone entity after the
spinoff. In contrast, the parent in an equity carve-out maintains a controlling interest in the
carved-out subsidiary so that some residual cross-subsidization and investment inefficiency may
persist even after the divestiture.

Therefore, if the post-divestiture elimination of internal

inefficiencies leads to a decline in the cost of equity, this effect would be most discernable in
spinoffs. In the case of asset sales, the analysis of risk profiles and cost of equity changes is
confounded because the divested assets become part of another firm and the cost of equity of the
divested division cannot be measured unambiguously. A spinoff is free from these effects since
it cleanly separates the assets while essentially preserving the assets completely in the two
entities created post spinoff. Therefore, any changes in systematic risk and the cost of equity
around the spinoffs must be a consequence of the elimination of inefficiencies.
Our paper is motivated by and complements prior studies on corporate spinoffs that have
examined whether improvements in the operating performance of the post-spinoff entities
explain the positive abnormal returns around spinoff announcements. In this context, Daley,
Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997) document a significant increase in operating performance from
before to after the spinoff for focus-increasing spinoffs. Desai and Jain (1999) present similar
results and further report a positive relation between the announcement-period returns and future
operating performance changes.

These studies conclude that investors’ expectation of
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improvements in future cash flows explains part of the announcement period abnormal returns.
However, they do not analyze whether changes in cost of equity may also be responsible for the
gains from spinoffs.
There are at least four reasons to believe that spinoffs could affect the cost of equity
capital.

First, the diversity cost hypothesis in Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) and

Scharfstein and Stein (2000) argues that there is a cost to firm diversity due to the rent-seeking
behavior by divisional managers of multi-division firms. Ahn and Denis (2002) and Burch and
Nanda (2002) find evidence consistent with lowered agency costs and a reduced discount in
share price following spinoffs. Hence, as manager-shareholder agency costs decrease following
spinoffs, we would expect an associated decrease in the cost of equity. Second, Gertner, Powers,
and Scharfstein (2002) show that asset restructuring through spinoffs leads to efficient
redeployment of the assets and improvement in investment efficiency. To the extent that the
restructuring and redeployment of the assets alters the systematic risk characteristics of the
assets, we would expect a change in the cost of equity following spinoffs. Third, Parrino (1997),
Dittmar (2002), and Mehrotra, Mikkelson, and Partch (2002) document that debt is reallocated
and capital structure is altered following spinoffs, which may cause a change in the financial risk
of the firm. Therefore, we would expect to observe a change in the cost of equity around
spinoffs. Finally, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) and Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu
(2001) show that there is lower information asymmetry and increased transparency following
spinoffs. Merton (1987) argues that any such changes that reduce the cost of obtaining reliable
information should lower adverse selection costs of equity.
Using Fama-French (1993) four-factor regressions, we first study whether there is a
change in the systematic risk of equity subsequent to a spinoff. We compare the betas of the four
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factors (equity betas) of a weighted combination of the post-spinoff parent and subsidiary with
the equity betas of the pre-spinoff firm. We examine whether the reallocation of assets, focus
improvements, reduced information asymmetry, and the mitigation of agency costs and other
inefficiencies lead to a decline in the equity betas subsequent to spinoffs. Individually analyzed,
the Fama-French factor betas represent the sensitivity of equity returns to specific systematic risk
factors. In addition, the predicted returns from the Fama-French regressions provide a measure
of the overall expected returns specified by the systematic risk factors. We use these predicted
returns as our measure of the overall expected cost of equity for firms undertaking spinoffs. In
addition to analyzing the individual equity betas, we also study whether this overall cost of
equity declines for the sample firms subsequent to the spinoffs.
Evidence in prior studies of capital structure changes following spinoffs suggest that any
changes in systematic risk of the post-spinoff entities could be due to changes in financial risk
rather than changes in asset risk. Therefore, we directly study whether there is a change in the
asset risk subsequent to spinoffs. We use the debt ratios of the pre-spinoff and post-spinoff
entities to unlever the equity betas and estimate the asset betas of the entities. We also compare
the systematic risk and cost of equity of the post-spinoff parent firms with that of the post-spinoff
subsidiary firms to examine whether spinoffs separate divisions with assets that are in different
risk classes. Finally, in a multiple regression framework, we study whether the gains around
spinoffs are related to the anticipated changes in cost of equity.
When we analyze the Fama-French factor betas for the pre-spinoff entity and the
weighted combination of the post-spinoff parent and subsidiary, our results do not reveal any
systematic decreases in any of the betas. These patterns hold for the asset betas as well.
Furthermore, when we analyze the changes in the overall cost of equity, we find no evidence of a
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decline in the overall cost of equity in the sample. We further explore whether similar results
obtain even in subsamples of spinoffs shown (in prior studies) to have the greatest increase in
value for the shareholders – focus-increasing spinoffs and spinoffs by firms with high
information asymmetry. We find this is largely the case. The results therefore suggest that the
gains around spinoffs are primarily a consequence of improvements in cash flow and operating
performance rather than due to a decline in systematic risk or the cost of equity.
An interesting finding emerges when we compare the equity betas and the cost of equity
of the pre-spinoff firm with those of the post-spinoff parent firm. We again find that there is no
significant difference in the equity betas or in the cost of equity in the full sample. However,
when we analyze the subsample of firms with high levels of information asymmetry prior to the
spinoffs, we find a significant decrease in the overall cost of equity for the post-spinoff parent
compared to the pre-spinoff firm.
This result may initially appear to be not very important given that we find no significant
difference in the cost of equity between the pre-spinoff firm and the weighted combination of
post-spinoff parent and subsidiary. After all, shareholders receive proportional ownership in
both the post-spinoff parent and the subsidiary, and so a decrease in the cost of equity of one
entity may not be valuable if it is offset by the other entity. However, it is possible that the cost
of equity of the weighted combination of the post-spinoff entities is not lowered, yet there is an
improvement in value because the decrease in the cost of equity is in that entity which benefits
disproportionately more from the change. For instance, a decrease in the cost of equity of the
parent may be more value enhancing and may more than offset the value lost due to an increase
in the cost of equity of the subsidiary. This could be the case in spinoffs since, as documented in
Jongbloed (1994) and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), the parent firms are typically
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higher growth than the subsidiaries, more reliant on external capital, and issue more external
equity following spinoffs. Thus, the parent firms may benefit disproportionately more from a
decrease in the cost of equity.
Consistent with the view that the decrease in the cost of equity for the parent affects value
disproportionately, regression results show a significant negative relation between the change in
cost of equity and the stock price reaction around spinoffs for firms with high information
asymmetry.

The regression results also indicate a statistically significant relation between

decrease in the cost of equity and the stock price reaction in the subsample of non-focusincreasing spinoffs. This latter subsample contains firms that divest subsidiaries that are in the
same 2-digit SIC code as the parent, and has been shown by Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar
(1997) and Desai and Jain (1999) to have little improvement in future cash flow. Yet, there is a
positive stock price reaction even for these spinoffs, and our results suggest that these gains
accrue predominantly through a decrease in the cost of equity. Overall, our results indicate that
in the full sample, gains from spinoffs are mainly due to cash flow and operating performance
improvements.

But a more detailed analysis reveals that for firms with high information

asymmetry and for firms that divest related subsidiaries, the gains are related to a decrease in the
cost of equity in addition to any potential cash flow increases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present arguments
for why cost of equity could decline around corporate spinoffs. In Section 3 we describe the
data, sample characteristics, and the methodology used to measure changes in systematic risk
and the overall cost of equity. In Section 4 we discuss the results of our empirical analyses.
Section 5 provides some concluding comments.
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2.

The Impact of Spinoffs on the Cost of Equity
Extant empirical evidence supports theories that argue that spinoffs enhance shareholder

value by improving the post-spinoff cash flow and operating performance of firms. Most of
these theories also provide implications for value enhancement arising from a decrease in the
cost of equity. Although cash flow and operating performance improvements and a decrease in
cost of equity are not mutually exclusive sources of the gains around spinoffs, the possibility that
cost of equity decreases may explain some of the gains has been largely ignored in the empirical
literature. Below we summarize several reasons why spinoffs could lead to a decline in the cost
of equity of the post-spinoff entities.
One of the arguments for a decline in the cost of equity following spinoffs arises from the
inefficiencies of corporate diversification. Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992), Rajan, Servaes,
and Zingales (2000), and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) argue that internal capital markets provide
incentives to divisional managers to engage in value-eroding bargaining and divisional rentseeking behavior that could lead to overinvestment in divisions with poor investment
opportunities.3 Their arguments imply a discounted share price and a higher cost of equity for
diversified firms due to the increased manager-shareholder agency conflicts in these firms.
Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997), Desai and Jain (1999), Ahn and Denis (2002), and
Burch and Nanda (2002) argue that the gains documented around spinoffs are due to the
elimination of such inefficiencies in multi-division firms. The evidence suggests that because
spinoffs break-up conglomerates and create stand alone entities they mitigate some of these
manager-shareholder agency conflicts. This would imply a reduction in the discount in share
prices and a decrease in the cost of equity subsequent to spinoffs.
3 Lamont (1997) and Shin and Stulz (1998) find evidence of cross-subsidization across divisions of diversified firms

and show that capital allocation is inefficient in these firms.
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Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) argue that the internal capital market inefficiencies
are increasing in the diversity of the divisions of a firm. Consistent with this argument, Gertner,
Powers, and Scharfstein (2002) report that investment of the subsidiary is relatively insensitive to
growth opportunities prior to a spinoff, but becomes more sensitive subsequent to the spinoff,
especially for spinoffs that separate unrelated divisions. Ahn and Denis (2002) present similar
evidence in the post-spinoff parent-subsidiary combination. The Rajan, Servaes, Zingales (2000)
argument implies a higher agency cost of equity for firms that are diversified across unrelated
lines, and a bigger decline in the cost of equity when these firms spinoff unrelated divisions and
eliminate the negative synergies. We would therefore, expect a bigger decline in the cost of
equity for spinoffs that separate unrelated divisions (focus-increasing spinoffs) than for spinoffs
that separate related divisions (non-focus-increasing spinoffs).
Another reason for a change in the cost of equity is the potential change in financial risk
around spinoffs. In a case study of the Marriott spinoff, Parrino (1997) documents that debt is
reallocated in a manner that is disproportionate to the debt servicing abilities of the assets of the
entities created in the spinoff. In a broader sample of spinoffs, Dittmar (2002) documents that
firms utilize spinoffs to restructure the post-spinoff parent and subsidiary capital structures closer
to their respective industry counterparts. Mehrotra, Mikkelson, and Partch (2002) also show that
capital structure is reallocated following spinoffs in accordance with the trade-off theory.4
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) report increased external financing activity following
spinoffs, which may also cause a change in capital structure. These capital structure changes
lead to a change in the financial risk of the firm, affecting in turn the systematic risk and the cost
of equity of firms engaging in spinoffs.
4 In fact, Maxwell and Rao (2002) show that reallocation of debt around spinoffs significantly affects debt values,

thereby potentially altering capital structure.
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Finally, the information hypothesis for the gains around spinoffs provides another reason
for a change in the cost of equity following spinoffs. Merton (1987) argues that any institutional
development that reduces the costs of obtaining reliable information about a firm should reduce
the rate of return required by investors. In the context of spinoffs the information hypothesis
argues that there is increased transparency post-spinoff. Because parents and subsidiaries trade
separately, it facilitates an increase in analyst following and a better matching of the industry
specialization of the analysts to the post-spinoff entities (Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu, 2001).
In conjunction with Merton’s arguments the information hypothesis implies a decline in the cost
of equity following spinoffs due to the reduced information costs.
Habib, Johnsen, and Naik (1997) and Nanda and Narayanan (1999) formally model the
information asymmetry problem and demonstrate that gains in spinoffs can arise from the
mitigation of information asymmetry and the intermediation improvements associated with
spinoffs. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) provide direct empirical evidence consistent
with the predictions of the information hypothesis. They find that spinoffs enhance value
because they mitigate the information asymmetry in the market about the riskiness, profitability,
and operating efficiency of the different divisions of a firm. Since the amount of information, as
well as the quality of information about the different divisions improves after a spinoff, adverse
selection costs decrease, and we would expect to see a decline in the cost of equity subsequent to
the spinoff.5 Another implication of this argument is that the decline in the cost of equity should
be positively related to the level of information asymmetry about a firm prior to the spinoff.

5 In fact, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) show that consistent with the view that adverse selection costs are

lowered, firms raise more external equity following spin-offs.
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3.

Data and Methodology

3.1.

Sample selection and characteristics
The sample consists of firms that complete spinoffs during the period 1979 to 1995. We

obtain spinoff transactions from the following sources: (i) stock distributions by firms trading on
the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq, that the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) classifies
as spinoffs, (ii) firms in the National Automated Accounting Research System whose annual
reports disclose spinoffs, and (iii) news wires and articles on Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street
Journal that report spinoff transactions by firms. From this sample, we eliminate equity carveouts, new issues of a different class of a firm’s own stock, stock dividends in the stock of other
previously existing firms that are not subsidiaries of the firm, tracking stock issues, and other
non-spinoff events that some of the above mentioned sources occasionally identify as spinoffs.
We also exclude distributions of shares in royalty trusts, real estate investment trusts, closed-end
funds and limited partnerships because these are often undertaken for tax motives and don’t
represent the separation of different segments of a firm. Finally, we exclude spinoffs undertaken
solely to facilitate the merger or sale of either the parent or subsidiary firm. These procedures
result in an initial sample of 253 spinoff transactions. We require that these spinoffs have
declaration and ex-dividend dates available on CRSP or Moody’s Dividend Records, and stock
returns data on CRSP. This reduces our sample to 200 spinoff transactions in which 211
subsidiaries are divested.
The subsidiaries divested in the spinoff transactions are identified by cross-checking the
transactions with the details in Moody’s Dividend Records, and in news wires and Wall Street
Journal articles on Lexis-Nexis. Of the 200 spinoffs, in 195 spinoffs the parent firm divested 1
subsidiary each, in 3 spinoffs the parent divested 2 subsidiaries each, in 1 spinoff the parent
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divested 3 subsidiaries, and in 1 spinoff the parent divested 7 subsidiaries. Table 1 reports the
frequency of spinoffs in each of the years in the sample period.
To measure equity betas and the cost of equity before and after spinoffs, our analysis uses
monthly returns data on CRSP prior to the declaration date and after the ex-dividend date of the
spinoffs. While all 200 spinoffs have returns data available prior to the spinoff, 3 parent firms
and 22 subsidiaries do not have post-spinoff data available. Thus, our analysis of parent firms
uses 197 spinoff transactions, and the analysis of subsidiaries uses 175 transactions. This is
comparable to the sample size of 157 firms in Desai and Jain (1999), who use a similar set of
criteria for selecting their sample. Like the sample in this study, the Desai and Jain sample also
spans a 17-year period, but begins in 1975 instead of 1979, and ends in 1991 instead of 1995.
In Table 2, we present some descriptive statistics for the sample of spinoffs. The average
market capitalization of the combined firm in the year prior to the spinoff completion is $2.2
billion. After the completion of the spinoff, the average market capitalizations of the parent
entity and the spun-off subsidiaries are $1.8 billion and $735 million respectively in the year of
the spinoff completion. Based on these post-spinoff market capitalizations, the average relative
size of divested subsidiary, computed as the ratio of the market capitalization of the subsidiary to
the sum of the market capitalizations of the parent and subsidiary, is just over 27%. This relative
size measure is very comparable to the 29% relative size documented in Vijh (1994) and Desai
and Jain (1999). We also compute an alternative relative size measure using the book value of
assets of the entities. The average book value of assets of the combined firm in the year prior to
the completion of the spinoff is $5.2 billion. After the spinoff the average book value of assets
of the parent firm is $4.1 billion while that of the divested subsidiary is $2.9 billion. Based on
the book values of assets, the average relative size of the divested unit is about 26.6%. Dittmar
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(2002) reports a comparable mean relative size of 24% based on book value of assets.

3.2.

Methodology
We estimate the systematic risk for each sample firm using the Fama-French four-factor

regression model. Fama and French (1993) show that a three-factor model that includes the
market risk premium, the return on a size factor, and the return on a book-to-market ratio factor
explain the cross section of monthly stock returns better than the traditional one-factor market
model. They argue that these factors represent latent risk variables that are not captured by the
market risk premium. Recently, Carhart (1997) shows that including the return on a momentum
factor (recent stock price performance) improves the explanation of returns. The coefficient of
each factor in these regressions represents the systematic sensitivity of the monthly equity
returns to each of the risk factors. Thus, the coefficients represent the equity betas for each firm.
We use these four factors in a time-series regression over a 36-month period ending in
the month prior to the declaration date of the spinoff to estimate the systematic risk for each
sample firm before the spinoff. The dependent variable in the regressions is the monthly return
for each firm in excess of the monthly risk-free rate. We similarly estimate the post-spinoff
systematic risk for each parent and each subsidiary by regressing the four factors on the monthly
excess return in a 36-month period beginning the month after the ex-dividend date of the
spinoff.6 The change in these equity betas from before the spinoff to after the spinoff represent
the effect of the spinoff. We compare the equity betas of the weighted combination of the postspinoff parent and subsidiary with the equity betas of the pre-spinoff firm. We repeat the
analysis by comparing the pre-spinoff firm with just the post-spinoff parent. The change in the
6 Our estimation procedure is similar to that used by Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) to investigate

systematic risk changes around dividend changes. The main difference is that they use a three-factor model while
we include the momentum factor as the fourth factor. As a robustness test, we also use the three-factor model, but
find qualitatively similar results. In addition, we follow Grullon, et. al., (2002) and Desai and Jain (1999) in our use
of a 36-month estimation window.
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equity betas for each firm is measured using the following model:
R it - Rft =

+ ∆i ∗ Dt + bi RMRF + b∆i RMRF∗ Dt + si SMB t + s∆i SMBt ∗ Dt
+ h i HML t + h ∆i HMLt ∗ D t + pi PR1YR t + p∆i PR1YRt ∗ D t + et
i

(1)

The four factors in the Fama-French regressions are RMRF, SMB, HML, and PR1YR.
For each month, RMRF is the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq firms
minus the one-month T-Bill rate.

SMB is the return on a zero-investment size portfolio,

computed as the return on a portfolio of small firms minus the return on a portfolio of large
firms. HML is the return on a zero-investment book-to-market ratio portfolio, computed as the
return on a portfolio of high book-to-market ratio firms minus the return on a portfolio of low
book-to-market ratio firms. PR1YR is the return on a zero-investment momentum portfolio,
computed as the return on a portfolio of good performers minus the return on a portfolio of poor
performers. Good (poor) performers are those in the top (bottom) 30 percent of all NYSE,
AMEX, and Nasdaq firms based on one-year holding period returns. The intercept in each
regression measures the risk-adjusted abnormal performance of the firms undertaking spinoffs.
To capture the pre-spinoff to post-spinoff change in the equity betas, we use an indicator
variable Dt that is 1 in the 36 months after the spinoff ex-dividend date and 0 otherwise. We
interact each of the four factors with this variable to capture the change in each equity beta after
the spinoff. Thus, the coefficients b, s, h, and p, in equation 1 represent the equity betas in the
pre-spinoff period, and the coefficients of the interaction terms b∆, s∆, h∆, and p∆, represent the
incremental change in the equity betas in the post-spinoff period relative to the pre-spinoff
betas.7

If spinoffs eliminate agency costs, negative synergies, and internal capital market

inefficiencies, we would expect the coefficients of the interaction terms to be negative.
7 The coefficient of the interaction of the intercept with D in each regression measures the incremental risk-adjusted
t

abnormal performance in the post-spinoff period relative to the pre-spinoff period. We also estimated equation (1)
without the interaction of the intercept with Dt, but our results did not change qualitatively.
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One concern with analyzing only the individual equity betas is that not all of the four
equity betas need to decrease in order for the firm to experience a general decrease in risk
following a spinoff. Moreover, some of the equity betas could actually increase, yet, the overall
riskiness could decrease after the spinoff. Thus, we need a measure of riskiness that captures the
overall impact of these four equity betas. We use the predicted returns from the Fama-French
regressions to obtain a measure of the overall impact of the systematic risk factors. For each
firm, the predicted risk premium is measured by multiplying each factor beta with the average
return on the factor estimated over the 1963 to 1998 period, and summing over the four factors.
We then add the average monthly risk free rate to the risk premium and then multiply by twelve
to obtain the predicted annual return. The predicted returns can be interpreted as the overall
expected cost of equity for firms undertaking spinoffs. We study whether this overall cost of
equity declines subsequent to the spinoffs.
We perform three sets of analyses using the change in the equity betas and the change in
the overall expected cost of equity. In our primary analysis, we compare the equity betas and
cost of equity of a weighted combination of the post-spinoff parent and subsidiary firms with
those of the pre-spinoff firm. For each spinoff, we synthetically combine the post spinoff entities
using weights based on the market capitalization of the entities as well as weights based on their
book value of assets. We elaborate on these weighting schemes in section 3.2.1.
We also analyze the asset betas and the unlevered cost of equity of the post-spinoff
parent-subsidiary combination with those of the pre-spinoff firm. Here, we examine whether
changes in systematic risk of the post-spinoff entities could be due to changes in their financial
risk rather than changes in asset risk. Unlevereing the equity betas to obtain asset betas and the
unlevered cost of equity allows us to examine changes in risk characteristics without the
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confounding effects of changes in financial risk.
Following Healy and Palepu (1990), Dann, Masulis, and Mayers (1991), and Hertzel and
Jain (1991) we use the modified Hamada (1972) equation to obtain the asset betas for each of the
four risk factors before and after the spinoff.
A

=

[ S (D(1−

S

)+ S)]

(2)

where βA is the asset beta, βS is the beta of equity, τ is the corporate tax rate, D is the value of
debt, and S is the value of equity. The modified Hamada equation presented above assumes that
the beta of debt is zero.8 To compute the pre-spinoff asset betas we use the leverage ratio
measured as of the fiscal year end immediately prior to the spinoff announcement. To compute
the post-spinoff asset betas we use the leverage ratio measured as of the fiscal year end
immediately following the spinoff completion.
In order to gain insights into whether spinoffs separate entities with assets that are in
different risk classes, we also directly compare the equity betas and the cost of equity of the postspinoff parent and the post-spinoff subsidiary. If one of the disadvantages of operating as a
combined firm is a mis-classification of the parent’s assets into a higher risk class (say, that of
the subsidiary), and if the spinoff eliminates this misperception, then we would expect to see a
significant difference between the equity betas and the cost of equity of the post-spinoff parent
firms and the post-spinoff subsidiaries. For each firm, we estimate the difference in the equity
betas between the post-spinoff parent and the post-spinoff subsidiary by estimating an equation
similar to (1) but in the 36-month period following the spinoff. Here, the indicator variable D is
1 for the parent and 0 for the subsidiary. Thus the coefficient of each interaction term measures

8 In our computations we assume a zero tax rate. This should not bias our results, however, since we are interested

in the changes in asset betas, and we assume the same tax rate both before and after the spin-off. Nevertheless, as a
robustness check, we also compute the asset betas assuming a 39% corporate tax rate, as in Grullon, Michaely, and
Swaminathan (2002), but this alternative assumption does not qualitatively affect our results.
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the difference in the equity beta between the parent and the subsidiary (parent minus subsidiary).
We report the cross-sectional mean and median of the coefficients of the interaction terms.
In addition to the above analysis, we compare the equity betas and cost of equity of the
post-spinoff parent with the pre-spinoff firm. Since the parent firms are typically bigger and
operate on a larger scale and scope, a unit decrease in the cost of equity of the parent may have a
larger impact on the gains around spinoffs than a corresponding decrease in the cost of equity of
the subsidiary. This is especially true if the parent firm has more growth opportunities and is
more reliant on external capital as documented in Jongbloed (1994) and Krishnaswami and
Subramaniam (1999).

Thus, the benefits of a decline in the cost of equity may be

disproportionately higher for the parent firm than for the subsidiary. Therefore, the relation
between changes in cost of equity and gains around spinoffs may be more discernable when we
focus on the comparison between the pre-spinoff firm and the post-spinoff parent entity.

3.2.1. Weighting schemes for combining post-spinoff parent and subsidiary
On the spinoff ex-dividend date, the parent and subsidiaries become independent firms
with independently traded shares.

Hence, it is necessary to construct weighted pro-forma

combined firm returns for the months following the spinoff in order to allow for an appropriate
comparison of the systematic risk of the newly created parent and subsidiary with that of the prespinoff firm. The ideal weights for this purpose would be the relative market values of the parent
and the subsidiaries immediately before the spinoff.

Unfortunately, these weights are not

available because separate stock prices for the subsidiaries are not available prior to the spinoff.
Therefore, in our first weighting scheme, following Desai and Jain (1999), we construct the
weights using the next best option, the market capitalizations of the parent and subsidiary
immediately following the spinoff.
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The potential weakness of this weighting scheme is that value changes around the spinoff
may influence the weights, which would in turn influence the measurements of systematic risk
changes. In order to mitigate the impact of any value changes around the spinoffs on the
weights, we use the book value of assets of the post-spinoff entities in our second weighting
scheme. In contrast to the accounting rules for mergers, the accounting rules for spinoffs do not
call for a revaluation of book assets to reflect market values.

However, the

book value

weighting scheme has two disadvantages. The first one is simply that the relative book values of
assets may differ from relative market values. Second, the book weights may be influenced by
operating and financing activities not relevant to our analysis, that occur after the spinoff
completion but before the first fiscal year end.

4.

Empirical Results

4.1.

Comparing post-spinoff parent-subsidiary combination to pre-spinoff firm
In Table 3 we present the equity betas from the Fama-French 4-factor model, and the

changes in the equity betas for the post-spinoff entity compared to the pre-spinoff firm. In the
post-spinoff period, we use the combination of parent and subsidiary, weighted using the two
methods described in section 3.2.1. For each factor, the table reports the cross-sectional mean
and median of its coefficient (factor loading) across all firms in the sample. Panel A presents the
results using the market value weights to create the post-spinoff entity, and panel B presents the
results using the book value weights. In the last column of Table 3 we report the overall cost of
equity for the pre-spinoff firm and the change in the cost of equity for the post-spinoff entity
compared to the pre-spinoff firm.
It may be seen from panels A and B of table 3 that the coefficients of the market risk
factor (RMRF) and the size factor (SMB) are positive and significant, the coefficient of the
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momentum factor (PR1YR) is negative and significant, while the coefficient of the book-tomarket factor (HML) though positive is generally not statistically significant. Overall, from
panel A, the mean cost of equity for the pre-spinoff firms is 13.67% while the median is 12.52%.
If the improvement in focus, elimination of negative synergies, and the mitigation of information
asymmetry through spinoffs affect the cost of equity, we would expect a decrease in the factor
loadings and the overall cost of equity. However, the results presented in Table 3 do not provide
evidence that the benefits from spinoffs accrue via a decrease in systematic risk or through an
overall reduction in the cost of equity.
Table 3 shows that the mean difference in the factor loadings between the post-spinoff
combined entity and the pre-spinoff firm (i.e., post–pre) is not statistically significant for any of
the factor loadings in either the market or the book-weighted samples. Similar results are also
true for the medians, except for the loading on the size factor. Panels A and B show that the
median post-spinoff combined entity loads more heavily on the size factor compared to the prespinoff firm, indicating an increase in sensitivity to size risk. This is not surprising given that a
spinoff breaks up a conglomerate firm into two or more smaller firms. The median change of
0.284 in the coefficient of the size factor in panel A suggests that a 1% increase in the return on
the size factor would increase the cost of equity of the post spinoff combined entity by 28 basis
points more than in the pre-spinoff firm. Thus, a weighted pro-forma combination of the postspinoff parent and subsidiary is actually more susceptible to size risk than the pre-spinoff firm.
The finding that none of the systematic risk factors decrease significantly after the
spinoff does not support the hypothesis that systematic risk changes contribute to the gains
experienced by spinoff firms. This result is further borne out by the change in the overall cost of
equity. From panel A, it may be seen that the mean cost of equity decreases by about 1.13% for
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the post-spinoff entity compared to the pre-spinoff firm. However, this change is not statistically
significant at conventional levels of significance. Similar results obtain even using book value
weights and in the medians.9
Our finding of an absence of any post-spinoff decline in the equity betas in the full
sample could have two interpretations – either there is no decline in the systematic risk, or asset
risk declines but is offset by an increase in financial risk due to changes in leverage. In order to
examine this, we compare the asset betas of the post-spinoff weighted combination of the parent
and subsidiary firms with the asset betas of the pre-spinoff firm, and present the results in panel
C of table 3. The results indicate that as with equity betas, there is no significant decline in any
of the asset betas, and no significant change in the unlevered cost of equity following spinoffs.
Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997) and Desai and Jain (1999) document that the
gains are higher for spin-offs that separate entities in unrelated lines of business due to the focus
improvements and elimination of negative synergies in these firms.

Krishnaswami and

Subramaniam (1999) show that the gains around spin-offs are higher for firms with higher
information asymmetry about their operations prior to the spinoffs. Motivated by these studies,
in Table 4 we separately analyze the equity betas and cost of equity for spinoffs sorted based on
whether they separate divisions in similar or unrelated lines, and spinoffs sorted based on the
level of pre-spinoff information asymmetry.
In panels A and B of table 4, we compare the change in equity betas and cost of equity
between focus-increasing and non-focus-increasing spinoffs. Spinoffs are defined as focusincreasing if the divested subsidiary has a two-digit SIC code that is different from the primary
two-digit SIC code of the parent. Spinoffs that separate a subsidiary that has the same two-digit
9 As a robustness test, following Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002), we repeat our analysis using an

estimation window of 18 months before and 18 months after the spinoff. The results do not change qualitatively.
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SIC code as the parent are classified as non-focus-increasing. If the mitigation of agency costs
of equity, elimination of negative synergies and other internal capital market inefficiencies
through spinoffs are reflected through a decrease in the cost of equity, we would expect a bigger
decline in the cost of equity for focus-increasing spinoffs than for non-focus-increasing spinoffs.
The results in panels A and B of table 4 indicate no significant post-spinoff decline in the
equity betas for either subsample. Moreover, there is no significant difference between the
change in the equity betas for the focus-increasing and the non-focus-increasing subsamples.
Similar results are obtained for the change in the cost of equity. In panel A of table 4, the focusincreasing subsample shows a post-spinoff increase in the cost of equity of 1.235% while the
non-focus-increasing subsample shows a decrease of 5.78%.

However, neither change is

statistically significant. Our results therefore suggest that the gains around spinoffs are primarily
a consequence of improvements in cash flow and operating performance rather than due to a
decline in systematic risk or the cost of equity.
In panels C and D of table 4, we compare the change in equity betas and cost of equity
between firms with high pre-spinoff information asymmetry and those with low information
asymmetry.

Following Dierkens (1991) and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), we

measure information asymmetry using the dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns
in the year preceding the spinoff announcement. This proxy relies on the assumption that stock
price movements not explained by market movements are due to firm-specific information, and
that at least some of this information is known to the managers but not to the outside investors.10
Firms are classified as operating under high information asymmetry if the dispersion is higher
than the median, otherwise they are classified as operating under low information asymmetry.
10 To the extent that some of the stock price movements are due to industry-wide (and not market-wide) information

that is a surprise to both the managers and the outside investors of the firm, this variable would overstate the level of
information asymmetry about a firm. There is, however, no bias in the overstatement across the firms.
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The information hypothesis implies a reduction in the adverse selection costs following spinoffs
that is positively related to the level of pre-spinoff information asymmetry. We would therefore,
expect a bigger decline in the cost of equity for spinoffs with high pre-spinoff information
asymmetry than for spinoffs with low information asymmetry.
When we use market weights to combine the parent and subsidiary post-spinoff, the
results in panel C of table 4 reveal no significant decline in the equity betas for either subsample.
When we analyze the change in the overall cost of equity, we find that firms with high
information asymmetry show a median (mean) decline of 1.48% (6.23%) in their cost of equity,
while firms with low information asymmetry show an increase of 2.43% (3.58%). However,
again, neither change is statistically significant. When we use book value weights to combine
the parent and the subsidiary, the results in panel D are weakly consistent with the implications
of the information hypothesis. The median change in the overall cost of equity is significantly
negative (-4.86%) for firms with high information asymmetry, while it is significantly positive
(2.971%) for firms with low information asymmetry. Overall, there is weak evidence of a
decline in the cost of equity for firms with high levels of information asymmetry.

4.2.

Comparison between post-spinoff parent and subsidiary
To examine whether spinoffs separate entities with assets that are in different risk classes,

we compare the equity betas and the cost of equity of the post-spinoff parent with those of the
post-spinoff subsidiary. We perform the analysis for the full sample and the subsamples sorted
based on focus improvements and information asymmetry prior to the spinoffs. These results are
presented in Table 5. In panel A of table 5, we find that the only significant difference in the
equity betas is in the beta associated with the size factor, with the subsidiary firms loading higher
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on this factor. 11 This is consistent with the subsidiaries being on average much smaller than the
post-spinoff parents. None of the other equity betas is significantly different between the postspinoff parent and subsidiary. Furthermore, even the difference in the size beta is not of much
economic significance, since there is no difference in the overall cost of equity between the
parents and the subsidiaries. Similar results obtain even in the subsamples of focus-increasing
and non-focus-increasing spinoffs (panel B), and in spinoffs by firms with high and low levels of
information asymmetry (panel C).

These results indicate that spinoffs do not necessarily

separate assets that are in different risk classes.

4.3.

Comparison between pre-spinoff firm and the post-spinoff parent
The results in table 3 indicate that there is no decrease in the cost of equity of the post-

spinoff parent-subsidiary combination compared to the pre-spinoff firm. Despite this finding,
changes in the cost of equity of the individual entities could still explain the gains from spinoffs
if the change in the cost of equity of one of the post-spinoff entities disproportionately affects
value. For instance, a decrease in the cost of equity of the parent may be more value enhancing
and may more than offset the value lost due to an increase in the cost of equity of the subsidiary.
We pursue this line of reasoning by comparing the equity betas and the cost of equity of the prespinoff firm with those of the post-spinoff parent firm. We focus on the post-spinoff parent since
prior literature reports evidence consistent with these firms standing to gain more from a decline
in the cost of equity.12
The results in panels A and B of table 6 indicate no significant difference in the equity

11 In fact, this result is mainly driven by the changes in the sensitivity to the size factor of the subsidiary. There is

no significant change in the sensitivity to the size factor of the post-spinoff parent compared to the pre-spinoff firm,
while there is an increase in the coefficient of the size factor for the post-spinoff subsidiary.
12 Jongbloed (1994) and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) report that the parent firms in spinoffs are
typically higher growth than the subsidiaries, more reliant on external capital, and issue more external equity
following spinoffs. Thus, the parent firms stand to benefit disproportionately from a decrease in the cost of equity.
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betas or in the cost of equity in the full sample and in the subsamples of focus-increasing and
non-focus-increasing spinoffs. However, in panel C of table 6, when we analyze the subsample
of firms with high levels of pre-spinoff information asymmetry, we find a significant decrease in
the cost of equity for the post-spinoff parent compared to the pre-spinoff firm. There is no such
decrease in the cost of equity for firms with low levels of pre-spinoff information asymmetry.
Coupled with the findings in Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) and Gilson, Healy, Noe,
and Palepu (2001) that firms with high levels of information asymmetry gain more from spinoffs
than do other firms, these results indicate that some of the gains for these spinoffs accrue through
a decreased cost of equity for the parent.

4.4.

Relation between gains around spinoffs and cost of equity changes
Overall, our results indicate that in the full sample, spinoffs do not lower the cost of

equity of the post-spinoff parent-subsidiary combination compared to the pre-spinoff firm.
However, in spinoffs by firms with high levels of information asymmetry, i.e., spinoffs likely to
be motivated by the possible elimination of adverse selection problems, there is a decrease in the
cost of equity. This suggests that the gains documented around spinoffs are predominantly
driven by anticipated improvements in cash flow and operating performance, and the only
instance where the gains are due to a decrease in the cost of equity is in the subsample of firms
with high levels of information asymmetry.13 We empirically examine the relation between the
announcement period abnormal returns and the changes in cost of equity in the full sample and

13 It should be noted that even a small change in the cost of equity can have a significant impact on prices. This

may be seen through a simple back-of-the-envelope computation using the Gordon growth model. In our sample,
the average annual dividend in the 3-year period prior to the spinoffs is $1.044 and the average stock price in the
same period is $23.264 per share. Applying our estimated pre-spinoff average annual cost of equity of 13.67% in
the Gordon growth model, the growth rate in dividends in the pre-spinoff period is inferred to be 9.18%. Assuming
that there is no change in the dividends or the growth in dividends post-spinoff, and using the average decline in cost
of equity of 1.13% estimated in Table 3, we compute a post-spinoff price per share of $31.094. This translates to
about a 34% increase in stock price that is solely a consequence of a 1.13% decline in the cost of equity.
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the different subsamples through OLS regressions. These results are reported in Table 7.
The dependent variable used in the regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR)
in the interval (–1,1). To compute the CARs, we employ a market model estimated over a 155day period ending 45 days before the announcement of the spinoff, and the CRSP valueweighted (and equal-weighted) index as the proxy for the market portfolio. Regressions 1
through 4 use the CARs computed with the CRSP value-weighted index, while regressions 1a
through 4a use the CARs computed with the CRSP equal-weighted index. Regressions 1 and 1a
use the cost of equity of the post-spinoff parent-subsidiary combination minus the cost of equity
of the pre-spinoff firm (∆CE) as the only independent variable. In regressions 2 and 2a, we
analyze the differential impact of ∆CE on abnormal returns between the focus-increasing and the
non-focus-increasing subsamples using indicator variables that interact with ∆CE.

FI is a

dummy variable that is 1 if the spinoff separates a subsidiary that is in a different two-digit SIC
code from the parent, and is 0 otherwise. Thus, the coefficient of ∆CE*FI captures the impact of
the change in cost of equity on abnormal returns in the subsample of focus-increasing spinoffs,
while ∆CE*(1–FI) captures the impact in the subsample of non-focus-increasing spinoffs.
In regressions 3, 3a, 4, and 4a, we analyze the differential impact of ∆CE on abnormal
returns between the high-information asymmetry and low-information asymmetry subsamples.
HIA is a dummy variable that is 1 for firms with pre-spinoff information asymmetry that is
above the median, and 0 otherwise. Thus, the coefficient of ∆CE*HIA captures the impact of the
change in cost of equity on abnormal returns in the subsample of spinoffs by firms with high
information asymmetry, while ∆CE*(1–HIA) captures the impact in the subsample of spinoffs
by firms with low information asymmetry.
The results in regressions 1 and 1a indicate that the coefficient of ∆CE is negative in both
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regressions but statistically significant in only 1a. Thus, there is some evidence that larger is the
decline in the cost of equity post-spinoff (i.e., more negative is ∆CE), higher is the
announcement period abnormal return. Although the univariate results in table 3 indicate that
the decline in the cost of equity is not statistically significant in the full sample, the regressions
indicate that the decline in cost of equity is positively correlated with value increases around
spinoffs. We also compute the economic impact of this variable.14 The coefficient of ∆CE in
regression 1a implies that when we decrease ∆CE by one standard deviation, the abnormal
returns increase by about 71 basis points. This represents about 49% of the average value gains
around spinoffs.
From regressions 2 and 2a, we find that the change in cost of equity is significantly
negatively related to abnormal returns only for the subsample of non-focus-increasing spinoffs.
The significant coefficient of –0.024 for ∆CE*(1–FI) in regression 2a implies that a decrease in
∆CE by one standard deviation in the subsample of non-focus-increasing spinoffs translates into
an increase in abnormal returns of about 110 basis points. This is 75% of the average value
gains around spinoffs. This suggests that the gains around spinoffs are, in part, driven by
decreases in the cost of equity only in the subsample of non-focus-increasing spinoffs, while
gains around focus-increasing spinoffs arise predominantly from anticipated improvements in
cash flow and operating performance and not from decreases in cost of equity. This evidence is
consistent with the finding in Desai and Jain (1999) that the cash flow and operating
performance improvements are primarily found in focus-increasing spinoffs and no such
improvements are seen in non-focus-increasing spinoffs.

14 We measure the economic impact of an independent variable as the change in the gains around spinoffs (as a

fraction of the mean wealth gain) when we change (in the direction that increases the gains) the variable by one
standard deviation from its mean.
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From regressions 3 and 3a, we find that the change in cost of equity is significantly
negatively related to abnormal returns only for the subsample of spinoffs by firms with high
information asymmetry. The coefficient of ∆CE*HIA is –0.029 and –0.030 in regressions 3 and
3a respectively, and they are significant at least at the 5% level of significance. In terms of the
economic impact of ∆CE in the subsample of spinoffs by firms with high information
asymmetry, using the coefficient from regression 3a, a decrease in ∆CE by one standard
deviation translates into an increase in abnormal returns of about 143 basis points. This is 98%
of the average value gains around spinoffs. This evidence is consistent with the information
hypothesis that spinoffs reduce information asymmetry and the resulting decrease in adverse
selection costs is reflected through a lowering in the cost of equity post-spinoff. These results
persist in regressions 4 and 4a, even when we control for the gains arising from focus
improvements. Overall, the results indicate that decreases in cost of equity are weakly positively
related to value gains around spinoffs in the full sample. This positive relation between decrease
in cost of equity and announcement period gains are confined to non-focus-increasing spinoffs
and spinoffs by firms with high levels of information asymmetry.

5.

Conclusion
Prior studies report significantly positive announcement period abnormal returns for

firms that divest through spinoffs.

These gains imply that investors expect either an

improvement in cash flow, a decrease in the cost of equity, or a combination of both effects
following spinoffs. Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997) and Desai and Jain (1999) study the
operating performance of firms reorganizing through spinoffs and find significant improvements
in future cash flow and operating performance, especially following spinoffs that separate
divisions in unrelated lines of business. Prior studies, however, do not examine changes in
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systematic risk and cost of equity following spinoffs. In this paper, we empirically investigate
whether the elimination of negative synergies and other inefficiencies, improvements in
information transparency, and improved alignment of managerial incentives through spinoffs
translate into a decrease in the cost of equity. We further examine whether the changes in cost of
equity explain the gains around spinoffs.
We use Fama-French (1993) four-factor regressions to estimate the equity betas before
and after the spinoffs. We also estimate the predicted returns from the Fama-French regressions
to obtain a measure of the overall expected cost of equity for firms undertaking spinoffs. When
we compare the equity betas and the cost of equity of the pre-spinoff firm with those of a
weighted combination of the post-spinoff parent and subsidiary, we do not find any significant
decrease in the systematic risk or the cost of equity. These results persist even when we analyze
subsamples of focus-increasing and non-focus-increasing spinoffs.

When we study the

subsample of spinoffs by firms with high levels of pre-spinoff information asymmetry, we find
only weak evidence of a decrease in the cost of equity. Our results therefore suggest that the
gains around spinoffs are primarily a consequence of improvements in cash flow and operating
performance rather than due to a decline in systematic risk or the cost of equity.
We also compare the equity betas and the cost of equity of the pre-spinoff firm with those
of the post-spinoff parent firm. We again find that there is no significant difference in the equity
betas or in the cost of equity in the full sample. However, when we analyze the subsample of
firms with high levels of information asymmetry prior to the spinoffs, we find a significant
decrease in the overall cost of equity for the post-spinoff parent compared to the pre-spinoff
firm. This result is important because prior studies report that the parent firms are typically
higher growth than the subsidiaries, more reliant on external capital, issue more external equity
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following spinoffs, and would benefit greatly from a reduction in adverse selection costs. So, a
unit decrease in the cost of equity of the parent may be more value enhancing and may more than
offset the value lost due to an increase in the cost of equity of the subsidiary. Our evidence
indicates that although for a majority of spinoffs the gains accrue via anticipated improvements
in cash flows and operating performance, the gains are also driven by a decrease in the cost of
equity for the subsample of firms with high adverse selection costs.
Finally, we directly examine the relation between change in cost of equity and the gains
around spinoffs. Consistent with the view that the decrease in the cost of equity for the parent
affects value disproportionately, we find a significantly positive relation between the decrease in
cost of equity and the stock price reaction around spinoffs for firms with high information
asymmetry. Thus, the results indicate that the mitigation of information asymmetry though
spinoffs translates into a decrease in the overall cost of equity for the parent entity in addition to
any potential cash flow increases it could generate. Additionally, in the subsample of spinoffs
that separate related divisions (non-focus-increasing spinoffs) we find that the announcement
period gains are related to the decline in the cost of equity. This is the subsample in which prior
literature has reported no subsequent cash flow improvements but yet a positive stock price
reaction. Our results suggest that the gains around these spinoffs accrue primarily through a
decrease in the cost of equity.
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Table 1
Frequency Distribution of Spinoffs
Panel A of the table lists the distribution of a sample of 200 spinoffs completed between January 1979 and
December 1995. Spinoffs are identified from CRSP, the National Automated Accounting Research
System, Lexis-Nexis, and the Wall Street Journal Index. Panel B presents the number of subsidiaries spunoff by the parent firm in each of the 200 spinoff events.
Panel A: Number of spinoffs in each sample year.
Year

Number of Spinoffs

1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

4
7
10
5
12
17
15
13
17
21
13
8
6
7
15
16
14

Total spinoffs:

200

Panel B: Number of subsidiaries spun-off by the parent firm in each of the 200 spinoff events.
Number of Subsidiaries Spun-off

Frequency

1
2
3
7

195
3
3
1

Total spinoffs:

200

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Firms that Completed Spinoffs
Descriptive statistics for a sample of 175 spinoffs completed in the period 1979-1995 for which data is
available from CRSP for the subsidiaries after the spinoff and for the parent before and after the spinoff.
Spinoffs are identified from CRSP, the National Automated Accounting Research System, Lexis-Nexis and
the Wall Street Journal Index. Market capitalization of the combined firm is the product of the total
number of shares outstanding and the closing price per share of the firm on the last trading day of the year
before the spinoff announcement year. Market capitalizations for the post-spinoff parent and subsidiaries
are computed similarly at the end of the completion month. Relative size-market equity is the ratio of the
market capitalization of the subsidiaries to the market capitalization of the subsidiaries plus the market
capitalization of the parent, measured at the end of the spinoff completion month. Book value of assets for
the combined firm is measured in the fiscal year before the spinoff announcement, while book value of
assets for the post-spinoff parent and subsidiaries is measured in the fiscal year after the spinoff. Relative
size-book assets is computed as the ratio of the book value of assets of the subsidiaries in the fiscal year
after the spinoff completion to the book value of assets of the parent plus the book value of assets of the
subsidiaries in the fiscal year after the spinoff. Equity to total value is the ratio of market value of equity to
market value of equity plus book value of debt measured in the fiscal year before the spinoff announcement
for the combined firm and in the fiscal year after the spinoff completion for the parent and the subsidiaries.
All statistics except ratios are in millions of dollars.
Variable

Mean

Median

Number of
Observations

Market capitalization of combined firm

2206.875

407.389

175

Market capitalization of parent after

1811.134

304.880

175

Market capitalization of subsidiaries

735.237

79.215

175

0.273

0.175

175

Book value of combined firm assets

5219.525

661.709

157

Book value of parent assets after

4111.557

659.690

157

Book value of subsidiary assets

2886.560

169.302

149

Relative size-book assets

0.266

0.223

133

Equity to total value for combined firm

0.682

0.731

156

Equity to total value of parent after

0.666

0.701

155

Equity to total value of subsidiaries

0.659

0.714

149

Relative size-market equity

Table 3
Comparison of Systematic Risk and Cost of Equity of the Post-spinoff Parent-Subsidiary Combination relative to the Prespinoff Firm
Firms completing spinoffs during the period 1979-1995 are identified from CRSP, the National Automated Accounting Research System, Lexis-Nexis and the
Wall Street Journal Index. To obtain a measure of pre-spinoff systematic risk and the post-spinoff change in systematic risk, for each firm we estimate the
following four-factor Fama-French regression using monthly data over 36-months each before the announcement and after the completion month of the spinoff.
Rit – Rft = ai + aDiDt + bi(Rmt – Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + piPR1YR + bDiDt(Rmt – Rft) + sDiDtSMBt + hDiDtHMLt+ pDiDtPR1YR+ ei
For each firm, the dependent variable is the firm’s monthly return in excess of the monthly riskfree rate. RMRF is the value-weighted market return on all
NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq firms minus the one-month T-Bill rate. SMB is the return on a portfolio of small firms minus the return on a portfolio of large firms.
HML is the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market ratio firms minus the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market ratio firms. PR1YR is the return on a
portfolio of good performers minus the return on a portfolio of poor performers. Good (Poor) performers are those in the top (bottom) 30 percent of all NYSE,
AMEX, and Nasdaq firms based on one-year holding period returns. Dt is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the 36 months after the completion month and 0
otherwise. For each firm in the post-spinoffs months, the monthly excess returns are computed as a weighted average of the excess returns of the post-spinoff
parent and subsidiaries using two sets of weights. The results using market weights are presented in Panel A and the results using book weights are presented in
Panel B. Market weights are constructed using the market value of equity of the parent and the subsidiaries immediately after the spinoff completion. Book
weights are based on the book value of the assets of the parent and the subsidiaries at the year-end of the spinoff completion. The panels present the crosssectional mean (median) of the corresponding coefficients from the regressions. The predicted values from the regressions, multiplied by 12, provide the annual
expected cost of equity pre-spinoff, and the change in the predicted values from before to after the spinoff represent the change in the cost of equity post-spinoff.
Panel C presents the mean (median) of the estimated changes in asset betas and the unlevered cost of equity from before to after the spinoffs. For each firm, asset
beta for each of the four factors is estimated using the following equation:
βa,i = βe,i (S (D + S))
where βa,i is the asset beta for factor i, βe,i is the equity beta for factor i estimated from the Fama-French regressions, S is the market value of equity and D is the
book value of debt. Change in the unlevered cost of equity is estimated by multiplying the change in the asset betas from before to after the spinoff by the
average annual factor returns for each of the four factors. Significance levels on the means (medians) are obtained from a two-tailed t-test (signed rank test). N
denotes the sample size. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Table 3 (continued)
Panel A: Equity Betas using Market Weights
RMRF

SMB

HML

PR1YR

Cost of Equity (%)

N

Pre-Spinoff

1.096***
(1.107***)

0.482***
(0.404***)

0.117
(0.125*)

-0.114*
(-0.189***)

13.67
(12.52)

175

∆ in Coefficients
(Post – Pre)

-0.225
(0.026)

0.170
(0.284*)

-0.480
(0.032)

0.208
(0.020)

-1.13
(0.63)

175

RMRF

SMB

HML

PR1YR

Cost of Equity (%)

Pre-Spinoff

1.091***
(1.104***)

0.518***
(0.378***)

0.089
(0.111)

-0.108
(-0.146***)

13.63
(12.51)

133

∆ in Coefficients
(Post – Pre)

-0.030
(0.011)

0.038
(0.277**)

-0.192
(-0.009)

-0.069
(0.034)

-1.92
(0.23)

133

∆ in RMRF beta

∆ in SMB beta

∆ in HML beta

∆ in PR1YR beta

∆ Cost of Equity (%)

Market Weighted

-0.030
(0.000)

0.021
(0.125)

0.026
(0.009)

-0.012
(0.036)

-0.184
(0.771)

126

Book Weighted

-0.025
(-0.005)

0.048
(0.110)

0.021
(-0.002)

-0.009
(0.048)

-0.091
(0.274)

126

Panel B: Equity Betas using Book Weights
N

Panel C: Asset Betas
N

Table 4
Systematic Risk and Cost of Equity of the Post-spinoff Parent-Subsidiary Combination relative to Pre-spinoff Firm Classified
by Change in Focus and Level of Information Asymmetry
Firms completing spinoffs during the period 1979-1995 are identified from CRSP, the National Automated Accounting Research System, Lexis-Nexis and the
Wall Street Journal Index. Panels A and B report the mean (median) values of the change in equity betas and the change in cost of equity for the subsamples of
non-focus-increasing and focus-increasing spinoffs. Changes in equity betas and cost of equity are estimated using a Fama-French four-factor model in a 72month window around the spinoff. A spinoff is classified as focus-increasing (non-focus-increasing) if the spunoff subsidiary is in a different (same) 2-digit SIC
code than the parent. In Panel A the post-spinoff combined entity is weighted using market weights, and in Panel B it is weighted using book weights. Market
weights are constructed using the market value of equity of the parent and the subsidiaries immediately after the spinoff completion. Book weights are based on
the book value of the assets of the parent and the subsidiaries at the year-end of the spinoff completion. Panels C and D report the mean (median) values of the
change in equity betas and the change in cost of equity for the subsamples of firms with high levels of pre-spinoff information asymmetry and those with low
levels of information asymmetry. Firms are classified as having high (low) levels of information asymmetry if the standard deviation of market-adjusted returns
in the year preceding the spinoff announcement exceeds (is lower than) the sample median. In Panel C the post-spinoff combined entity is weighted using
market weights, and in Panel D it is weighted using book weights. Significance levels on the means (medians) are obtained from a two-tailed t-test (sign rank
test). N denotes the sample size. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Panel A: Comparison between Non-focus-increasing and Focus-increasing subsamples - using Market Weights
∆ in RMRF beta

∆ in SMB beta

∆ in HML beta

∆ in PR1YR beta

∆ in Cost of Equity
(%)

N

Non Focus Increasing

-0.084
(0.187)

-0.037
(0.189)

-0.281
(0.119)

-0.310
(-0.004)

-5.780
(1.050)

59

Focus Increasing

-0.296
(-0.008)

0.276
(0.298)

-0.580
(0.029)

0.471
(0.054)

1.235
(0.523)

116

0.626
(0.330)

0.375
(0.991)

-0.641
(0.773)

0.122
(0.488)

0.296
(0.812)

p-value of difference
t-test
Wilcoxon Z

Table 4 (continued)
Panel B: Comparison between Non-focus-increasing and Focus-increasing subsamples - using Book Weights
∆ in RMRF beta

∆ in SMB beta

∆ in HML beta

∆ in PR1YR beta

Non Focus Increasing

-0.128
(0.025)

-0.117
(0.254)

-0.436
(0.068)

-0.183
(0.060)

∆ in Cost of Equity
(%)
-5.441
(0.924)

Focus Increasing

0.022
(-0.014)

0.120
(0.277)

-0.063
(-0.044)

-0.008
(0.031)

-0.064
(-0.482)

0.559
(0.463)

0.463
(0.925)

0.450
(0.927)

0.487
(0.870)

0.424
(0.742)

p-value of difference
t-test
Wilcoxon Z

N
46
87

Panel C: Comparison between Firms with High and Low Information Asymmetry - using Market Weights
∆ in RMRF beta

∆ in SMB beta

∆ in HML beta

∆ in PR1YR beta

High Information
Asymmetry

-0.495
(0.196)

0.227
(0.164)

-1.120
(-0.021)

0.195
(-0.116)

∆ in Cost of Equity
(%)
-6.230
(-1.481)

Low Information
Asymmetry
p-value of difference
t-test
Wilcoxon Z

0.024
(-0.030)

0.118
(0.304)

0.112
(0.086)

0.212
(0.172**)

3.576
(2.425)

0.321
(0.503)

0.744
(0.796)

0.097
(0.591)

0.969
(0.026)

0.093
(0.035)

N
84
91

Panel D: Comparison between Firms with High and Low Information Asymmetry - using Book Weights
∆ in RMRF beta

∆ in SMB beta

∆ in HML beta

∆ in PR1YR beta

High Information
Asymmetry

-0.164
-0.024)

-0.200
(0.315)

-0.343
(-0.044)

-0.443
(-0.157)

∆ in Cost of Equity
(%)
-8.523
(-4.860**)

Low Information
Asymmetry
p-value of difference
t-test
Wilcoxon Z

0.074
(0.017)

0.221*
(0.266*)

-0.075
(0.078)

0.221**
(0.212**)

3.181*
(2.971*)

0.298
(0.883)

0.125
(0.316)

0.523
(0.973)

0.004
(0.002)

0.040
(0.006)

N
58
75

Table 5
Comparison of Changes Systematic Risk and Cost of Equity between the Post-spinoff Parent and Subsidiaries
Firms completing spinoffs during the period 1979-1995 are identified from CRSP, the National Automated Accounting Research System, Lexis-Nexis and the
Wall Street Journal Index. To obtain a measure of pre-spinoff systematic risk and the post-spinoff change in systematic risk, for each firm we estimate the
following four-factor Fama-French regression using monthly data over 36-months after the completion month of the spinoff.
Rit – Rft = ai + aDiDt + bi(Rmt – Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + piPR1YR + bDiDt(Rmt – Rft) + sDiDtSMBt + hDiDtHMLt+ pDiDtPR1YR+ ei
For each firm, the dependent variable is the firm’s monthly return in excess of the monthly riskfree rate. RMRF is the value-weighted market return on all
NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq firms minus the one-month T-Bill rate. SMB is the return on a portfolio of small firms minus the return on a portfolio of large firms.
HML is the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market ratio firms minus the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market ratio firms. PR1YR is the return on a
portfolio of good performers minus the return on a portfolio of poor performers. Good (Poor) performers are those in the top (bottom) 30 percent of all NYSE,
AMEX, and Nasdaq firms based on one-year holding period returns. Dt is a dummy variable that equals 1 for parent firm returns, and 0 otherwise. The panels
present the cross-sectional mean (median) of the difference in the coefficients between the parent firms and the subsidiaries. Panel A presents the results for the
full sample, panel B presents the results for the subsamples of non-focus-increasing and focus-increasing spinoffs, and panel C presents the results for the
subsamples of firms with high and low information asymmetry. A spinoff is classified as focus-increasing (non-focus-increasing) if the spunoff subsidiary is in a
different (same) 2-digit SIC code than the parent. Firms are classified as having high (low) levels of information asymmetry if the standard deviation of marketadjusted returns in the year preceding the spinoff announcement exceeds (is lower than) the sample median. Significance levels on the means (medians) are
obtained from a two-tailed t-test (signed rank test). N denotes the sample size. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Panel A: Full Sample

Coefficients

∆ in RMRF beta

∆ in SMB beta

∆ in HML beta

∆ in PR1YR beta

∆ in Cost of Equity
(%)

N

0.346
(0.031)

-0.625***
(-0.521***)

0.263
(-0.184)

-0.446
(0.128)

-2.741
(-0.761)

175

Table 5 (continued)
Panel B: Comparison between Non-focus-increasing and Focus-increasing subsamples
∆ in RMRF beta

∆ in SMB beta

∆ in HML beta

∆ in PR1YR beta

∆ in Cost of Equity
(%)

N

Non Focus Increasing

-0.060
(-0.009)

-0.541
(-0.613**)

0.194
(-0.179)

-0.011
(0.106)

-0.488
(0.582)

59

Focus Increasing

0.553
(0.044)

-0.688**
(-0.507***)

0.299
(-0.299)

-0.668
(0.140)

-3.887
(-3.360)

116

0.417
(0.787)

0.785
(0.694)

0.910
(0.535)

0.463
(0.941)

0.707
(0.379)

p-value of difference
t-test
Wilcoxon Z

Panel C: Comparison between Firms with High and Low Information Asymmetry
∆ in RMRF beta

∆ in SMB beta

∆ in HML beta

∆ in PR1YR beta

∆ in Cost of Equity
(%)

N

High Information
Asymmetry

0.740
(0.440)

-0.487
(-0.133)

0.738
(-0.042)

-1.134
(0.081)

-5.758
(1.591)

84

Low Information
Asymmetry

-0.018
(0.008)

-0.753***
(-0.746***)

-0.175
(-0.527*)

0.188
(0.155)

0.044
(-2.577)

91

p-value of difference
t-test
Wilcoxon Z

0.423
(0.766)

0.563
(0.029)

0.379
(0.453)

0.253
(0.771)

0.475
(0.460)

Table 6
Comparison of Changes in Systematic Risk and Cost of Equity between the Post-spinoff Parent and the
Pre-spinoff Firm
Firms completing spinoffs during the period 1979-1995 are identified from CRSP, the National Automated Accounting Research System, Lexis-Nexis and the
Wall Street Journal Index. To obtain a measure of pre-spinoff systematic risk and the post-spinoff change in systematic risk, for each firm we estimate the
following four-factor Fama-French regression using monthly returns for the pre-spinoff firm over 36-months before the announcement, and monthly returns for
the post-spinoff parent over 36-months after the completion month of the spinoff.
Rit – Rft = ai + aDiDt + bi(Rmt – Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + piPR1YR + bDiDt(Rmt – Rft) + sDiDtSMBt + hDiDtHMLt+ pDiDtPR1YR+ ei
For each firm, the dependent variable is the firm’s monthly return in excess of the monthly riskfree rate. RMRF is the value-weighted market return on all
NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq firms minus the one-month T-Bill rate. SMB is the return on a portfolio of small firms minus the return on a portfolio of large firms.
HML is the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market ratio firms minus the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market ratio firms. PR1YR is the return on a
portfolio of good performers minus the return on a portfolio of poor performers. Good (Poor) performers are those in the top (bottom) 30 percent of all NYSE,
AMEX, and Nasdaq firms based on one-year holding period returns. Dt is a dummy variable that equals 1 for returns in the post-spinoff period, and 0 otherwise.
The panels present the cross-sectional mean (median) of the difference in the coefficients between the post-spinoff parent firms and the pre-spinoff firm. Panel A
presents the results for the full sample, panel B presents the results for the subsamples of non-focus-increasing and focus-increasing spinoffs, and panel C
presents the results for the subsamples of firms with high and low information asymmetry. A spinoff is classified as focus-increasing (non-focus-increasing) if
the spunoff subsidiary is in a different (same) 2-digit SIC code than the parent. Firms are classified as having high (low) levels of information asymmetry if the
standard deviation of market-adjusted returns in the year preceding the spinoff announcement exceeds (is lower than) the sample median. Significance levels on
the means (medians) are obtained from a two-tailed t-test (signed rank test). N denotes the sample size. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels respectively.

Panel A: Full Sample

Coefficients

∆ in RMRF beta

∆ in SMB beta

∆ in HML beta

∆ in PR1YR beta

∆ in Cost of Equity
(%)

N

-0.190
(-0.040)

-0.037
(0.126)

-0.088
(-0.022)

-0.077
(0.007)

-2.744
(-0.794)

197

Table 6 (continued)
Panel B: Comparison between Non-focus-increasing and Focus-increasing subsamples
∆ in RMRF beta

∆ in SMB beta

∆ in HML beta

∆ in PR1YR beta

∆ in Cost of Equity
(%)

N

Non Focus Increasing

-0.035
(0.196)

0.025
(0.150)

0.216
(0.039)

-0.155
(0.084)

-1.012
(1.759)

59

Focus Increasing

-0.057
(-0.025)

0.105
(0.189)

-0.054
(-0.105)

0.063
(-0.004)

0.276
(0.265)

116

0.956
(0.556)

0.846
(0.744)

0.690
(0.593)

0.473
(0.635)

0.888
(0.866)

p-value of difference
t-test
Wilcoxon Z

Panel C: Comparison between Firms with High and Low Information Asymmetry
∆ in RMRF beta

∆ in SMB beta

∆ in HML beta

∆ in PR1YR beta

∆ in Cost of Equity
(%)

N

High Information
Asymmetry

-0.335
(0.018)

-0.144
(-0.053)

-0.254
(-0.088)

-0.346
(-0.188)

-7.999
(-5.637**)

103

Low Information
Asymmetry

-0.032
(-0.042)

0.079
(0.192)

0.094
(-0.008)

0.218
(0.198**)

3.014
(2.632)

94

p-value of difference
t-test
Wilcoxon Z

0.294
(0.809)

0.450
(0.218)

0.460
(0.762)

0.020
(0.003)

0.087
(0.005)

Table 7
Regressions Relating Announcement Period Returns to Changes in the Cost of
Equity
Firms completing spinoffs during the period 1979-1995 are identified from CRSP, the National Automated
Accounting Research System, Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street Journal Index. The dependent variable is
the three-day cumulative abnormal return generated over the interval (-1,1). Abnormal returns are
calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 155-day period ending 45 days before the
spinoff announcement date. The table presents the results using both the CRSP value-weighted and equalweighted indices in the market model to estimate the betas. ∆CE is change in the cost of equity from
before to after the spinoff. FI is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the spinoff is focus-increasing
and 0 otherwise, and HIA is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for firms with high levels of
information asymmetry and 0 otherwise. A spinoff is classified as focus-increasing (non-focus-increasing)
if the post-spinoff subsidiary is in a different (same) 2-digit SIC code than the parent. Firms are classified
as having high (low) levels of asymmetric information if the standard deviation of market-adjusted returns
in the year preceding the spinoff announcement exceeds (is lower than) the sample median. p-values are in
parenthesis. N denotes the sample size. a, b, and c represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively.
Value-weighted Index

Intercept
∆CE

Equal-weighted Index

1

2

3

4

1a

2a

3a

4a

1.464
(<0.001)

1.438
(<0.001)

1.363
(<0.001)

1.325
(0.026)

1.455
(<0.001)

1.431
(<0.001)

1.370
(<0.001)

1.431
(0.018)

-0.019c
(0.063)

-0.016
(0.114)

∆CE*FI

-0.009
(0.602)

-0.011
(0.461)

∆CE*(1-FI)

-0.021c
(0.103)

-0.024c
(0.070)

∆CE*HIA

-0.029b
(0.011)

-0.029b
(0.012)

-0.030a
(0.010)

-0.029b
(0.011)

∆CE*(1-HIA)

0.024
(0.223)

0.024
(0.224)

-0.015
(0.455)

0.015
(0.451)

0.057
(0.938)

FI

N

R2

172

0.009

172

0.006

172

0.034

172

0.028

-0.094
(0.900)
172

0.014

172

172

172

0.011

0.030

0.024

